If I replace my entire body each functional unit at a time, at no point I become someone else. In this type of argument it seems like memory and its continuation is what gives me my unique self identity,
But what happens if there are two persons with the exact same memory. (Remember these are thought experiments so it is valid to assume such identical memory is possible to be instantiated and maintainable for a given amount of time.). Does that mean now I will be conscious in two bodies? Certainly we can't feel using a remote body. And what I can't feel is not me. And following this sense, what defines me is not memory but my body - which is a contradiction.
But what happens if there are two persons with the exact same memory. (Remember these are thought experiments so it is valid to assume such identical memory is possible to be instantiated and maintainable for a given amount of time.). Does that mean now I will be conscious in two bodies? Certainly we can't feel using a remote body. And what I can't feel is not me. And following this sense, what defines me is not memory but my body - which is a contradiction.
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